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INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN 
CONSTITUTION 
DANIEL R. SUHR? 
The Wisconsin Constitution is the state’s fundamental law and is often 
the final authority over important issues of public moment.  When inter-
preting a provision in the state constitution, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
relies on three primary sources: the plain meaning of the text, the legisla-
tive and ratification history surrounding the clause, and construction by 
the legislature.  The second and third sources that the Court uses to re-
solve constitutional cases are significantly flawed for both practical and 
jurisprudential reasons. 
By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court focuses first and foremost 
on the text when interpreting statutes.  The Court only turns to history 
when it must to resolve an obstinate ambiguity.  This approach avoids the 
flaws associated with the Court’s current method of constitutional inter-
pretation while also advancing positive values for the rule of law.  There-
fore, the author recommends that in its next constitutional case the Court 
should set aside its current methodology for constitutional interpretation 
and instead announce its adoption of its statutory method for constitu-
tional cases as well. 
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94 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
The challenge to the legislation here requires us to interpret the mean-
ing of a constitutional amendment ratified by voters.  Consequently, our 
task is to construe the amendment “to give effect to the intent . . . of the 
people who adopted it.”  We examine three sources to determine voter 
intent: “the plain meaning, the constitutional debates and practices of 
the time, and the earliest interpretations of the provision by the legisla-
ture, as manifested through the first legislative action following adop-
tion.”  In contrast with statutory construction, we do not stop with an 
analysis of the text, even if that analysis reveals unambiguous language. 
 
—Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Appling v. Doyle1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Dane County Circuit Court is a landmark in 
Wisconsin Supreme Court history.2  The outcome of the case was unre-
markable—the statute at issue was and remains obscure.3  Rather, Kalal 
is significant because the Court’s discussion of statutory interpretation 
moved the entire legal system of the state towards textualism and away 
from more malleable interpretative methods.  Kalal gave Wisconsin 
courts a whole new framework for statutory interpretation.  The case 
mandates that a court must first ask whether the statute’s text is ambig-
uous.4  If not, the court should apply the plain meaning of the text.  Only 
if the text is ambiguous may a court resort to extrinsic sources to resolve 
the ambiguity.5  Kalal deemphasized legislative history as an unreliable 
 
1. Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 11, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted) (quoting Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 
¶ 19, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408) (citing Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 
141, 149 (1976)). 
2. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
3. WIS. STAT. § 968.02(3) (2011–2012) (providing that a circuit judge may permit the fil-
ing of a complaint charging a person with a crime if the district attorney is unavailable or re-
fuses to issue one); Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 53, 57 (concluding that “refuses” under section 
968.02(3) was clear and unambiguous and affirming the circuit judge’s decision to file a com-
plaint when the district attorney refused to do so). 
4. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45. 
5. Id. ¶ 46.  Professor Abbe Gluck refers to this as “modified textualism.”  Abbe R. 
Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and 
the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1750 (2010); see also Adam G. Yoffie, 
From Poritz to Rabner: The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Statutory Jurisprudence, 2000–2009, 
35 SETON HALL LEG. J. 302, 311–15, 330 (2011) (discussing textualism and legislative history 
in the New Jersey Supreme Court through the lenses of Eskridge and Gluck). 
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 95 
guide for the interpretation of statutes.6  Instead, Justice Diane Sykes’s 
majority opinion upheld textualist values such as respect for the rule of 
law and judicial modesty.7 
Kalal’s commitment to textualism began with state statutes,8 but its 
rule has since been extended to other categories of legal texts, including 
federal statutes,9 local ordinances,10 state administrative rules,11 local 
administrative rules,12 and supreme court rules.13  Unique among other 
types of public law, the state constitution is not subject to Kalal.  When 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court interprets the Wisconsin Constitution, it 
instead uses a tripartite methodology first formalized in Busé v. Smith in 
1974: plain meaning, legislative and popular history, and contemporane-
ous acts of the legislature.14  As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated 
in the decision quoted as the epigram of this Article, Busé requires 
courts to go beyond the plain meaning of the constitution’s text, even 
when that meaning is unambiguous.15 
The court’s current approach to state constitutional interpretation is 
flawed because of its dependence on unreliable tools to perform an im-
possible task—discerning the hidden intent and unexpressed purpose of 
millions of voters.  The Kalal framework avoids these pitfalls and ad-
vances positive values for the rule of law.  As it has already done in oth-
er areas of public law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court should extend 
Kalal’s methodology to state constitutional interpretation. 
 
6. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 50–52. 
7. Id. ¶ 52. 
8. Id. ¶ 53. 
9. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 2006 WI 88, ¶ 36, 293 Wis. 2d 202, 717 
N.W.2d 280. 
10. Magnolia Twp. v. Town of Magnolia, 2005 WI App 119, ¶ 9, 284 Wis. 2d 361, 701 
N.W.2d 60. 
11. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶ 63, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 
N.W.2d 95. 
12. Nelson & Sons Painting v. Cardenas, 306 Wis. 2d 449, No. 2007AP645, 2007 WL 
2935808, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2007) (unpublished table opinion). 
13. In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 2010 WI 62, ¶¶ 1, 30, 325 
Wis. 2d 631, 784 N.W.2d 631 (opinion of Prosser, Roggensack, & Ziegler, JJ.); State v. Hen-
ley, 2010 WI 12, ¶¶ 1, 11, 322 Wis. 2d 1, 778 N.W.2d 853 (opinion of Roggensack, J.) (sitting 
as a single Justice). 
14. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149 (1976). 
15. Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 11, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666 (citing 
Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 568). 
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96 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
II. INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 
In the earliest days of the state, the Wisconsin Supreme Court used 
the same methodology to interpret both constitutional and statutory 
texts.16  Until 1974, the court relied on classical principles for all inter-
pretive questions.  The court would begin with the plain meaning of the 
words used.17  The court looked to the original public meaning of the 
text; “[t]he meaning of the constitutional provision having been once 
firmly established as of the time of its adoption, such meaning continues 
forever, unless it is changed or modified by the constitution.”18  One 
guide to this public meaning was popular dictionaries.19  In Kayden In-
dustries, Inc., decided in 1967, the court declared: 
Where there is no ambiguity in the literal terms of the [constitu-
tional] provision under consideration there is no room for judi-
cial construction. . . .  And the court may not venture outside the 
plain meaning of a provision in order to create an ambiguity and 
then resolve the ambiguity by what it finds outside.20 
 
16. State ex rel. Bond v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 184 (Wis. 1849) (“In deciding this question, 
our only guide is the constitution, in construing which we are to be governed by the same 
general rules of interpretation which prevail in relation to statutes.”); see also State ex rel. 
Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 191, 204 N.W. 803, 807 (1925) (“[I]n construing the con-
stitution we are governed by the same rules of interpretation which prevail in relation to stat-
utes.” (citing Bond, 2 Pin. at 184)); Akerly v. Vilas, 24 Wis. 165, 181 (1869). 
17. Payne v. City of Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 555, 259 N.W. 437, 439 (1935) (“‘[I]t is pre-
sumed that words appearing in a constitution have been used according to their plain, natural 
and usual signification and import, and the courts are not at liberty to disregard the plain 
meaning of words of a constitution in order to search for some other conjured intent.’” (quot-
ing approvingly from 6 RULING CASE LAW Constitutional Law § 47 (William M McKinney et 
al. eds., 1929))); B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324, 327 
(1925). 
18. State ex rel. Bare v. Schinz, 194 Wis. 397, 403, 216 N.W. 509, 511–12 (1927); see also 
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 368, 133 N.W. 209, 222 (1911) (Barnes, J., concurring); id. at 
371–73 (Marshall, J., concurring).  But see id. at 349 (majority opinion) (“When an eighteenth 
century constitution forms the charter of liberty of a twentieth century government must its 
general provisions be construed and interpreted by an eighteenth century mind in the light of 
eighteenth century conditions and ideals?  Clearly not.”). 
19. Ekern, 187 Wis. at 194 (looking to a definition from the Century Dictionary and En-
cyclopedia).  But see State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann, 201 Wis. 84, 97, 228 N.W. 593, 
598 (1930) (“We realize fully that a matter of this kind ought not to be determined wholly up-
on the basis of dictionary definitions; that what is to be sought is the intent as expressed in the 
constitution as amended.”). 
20. Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 732, 150 N.W.2d 447, 453–54 (1967) 
(citing State ex rel. Neelen v. Lucas, 24 Wis. 2d 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1964) for the 
first proposition and Estate of Ries, 259 Wis. 453, 459, 49 N.W.2d 483, 486 (1951) for the sec-
ond).  Interestingly, both Neelen and Estate of Ries were statutory interpretation cases, show-
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 97 
When a constitutional provision was ambiguous, the court sought to 
follow “the real meaning and substantial purpose of those who adopted 
it.”21  In these cases, the court attempted to effect the purpose of the 
amendment and the intended meaning of the framers.22  The primary 
sources used to establish them were the debates at the 1846 and 1848 
constitutional conventions.23  The court also considered past practice by 
responsible government officials and contemporaneous legislative con-
struction.24  The justices also reviewed analogous constitutional provi-
sions from other states.25  New York, in particular, was accorded a spe-
cial status because history shows that the Wisconsin drafters looked to 
the New York Constitution of 1846 as a model,26 although Wisconsin 
courts were not bound in their interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion by New York courts’ interpretation of analog New York constitu-
tional provisions.27  These general principles governed interpretation of 
the state constitution for much of Wisconsin’s history. 
The modern era began with Board of Education v. Sinclair, decided 
in October 1974.  Interpreting the meaning of “free” in the Wisconsin 
Constitution’s article on education, the court “look[ed] first to the plain 
meaning of the word in the context in which it [was] used.”28  Second, 
the court conducted a “historical analysis of what practices were in ex-
istence in 1848 which we [could] reasonably presume were also known 
to the framers of the 1848 constitution.”29  After doing this, the court 
 
ing that the principle from French that constitutional and statutory interpretation were the 
same remained effective as late as 1967.  See also Kayden Indus., Inc., 34 Wis. 2d at 732. 
21. State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 55, 7 N.W.2d 375, 381 (1942). 
22. Kayden Indus. Inc., 34 Wis. 2d at 729–30; Dammann, 201 Wis. at 96; Ekern, 187 Wis. 
at 184; State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 81, 151 N.W. 331, 350 (1915). 
23. Heil, 242 Wis. at 55; State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289–90, 221 N.W. 860, 
862 (1928); Owen, 160 Wis. at 81. 
24. State ex rel. Pluntz v. Johnson, 176 Wis. 107, 114–15, 186 N.W. 729, 730 (1922); Ow-
en, 160 Wis. at 111 (quoting Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43, 68, (1871)). 
25. Heil, 242 Wis. at 53–54 (quoting the constitutions of West Virginia and Nebraska to 
“illustrate the points made”). 
26. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 35 n.11, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460; Bablitch 
& Bablitch v. Lincoln Cnty., 82 Wis. 2d 574, 577, 263 N.W.2d 218, 221 (1978); Heil, 242 Wis. at 
56–57; B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 186 Wis. 10, 16, 202 N.W. 324, 326 (1925); Ja-
cobs v. Major (Jacobs I), 132 Wis. 2d 82, 101, 390 N.W.2d 86, 92 (Ct. App. 1986); see also 
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 955 (1982). 
27. B.F. Sturtevant Co., 186 Wis. at 17 (considering and rejecting a rule found by a New 
York court considering an analog provision); see also Jacobs I, 132 Wis. 2d at 101 (restating 
this principle from B.F. Sturtevant Co.). 
28. Bd. of Educ. v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 182, 222 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1974). 
29. Id. at 182–83. 
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98 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
“turn[ed] next to the earliest interpretation of this section of the consti-
tution by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following 
the adoption of the constitution.”30 
One month later, the court announced in Busé v. Smith: “In its in-
terpretation of constitutional provisions[,] this court is committed to the 
method of analysis utilized in Board of Education v. Sinclair.”31  This 
three-step analysis has governed the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation in almost every case since its an-
nouncement.32  In a later case, the court suggested a fourth step that is 
not traditionally incorporated alongside the original three: “[W]hen the 
Sinclair and Busé rules of constitutional interpretation do not provide an 
answer, the meaning of a constitutional provision may be determined by 
looking at the objectives of the framers in adopting the provision.”33 
It has been said on occasion, most recently in Coulee Catholic 
Schools v. LIRC, that the court can end its analysis of a constitutional 
provision if the meaning of the text is plain;34 however, in the over-
 
30. Id. at 184. 
31. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149 (1976).  As Professor Gluck 
points out, statements like this by state supreme courts stand in interesting contrast to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, where previous decisions do not set binding methodologies for future 
decisions.  See generally Gluck, supra note 5 (discussing “methodological stare decisis”). 
32. There are a handful of individual exceptions where the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
did not use this methodology.  See, e.g., McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶ 44, 326 Wis. 
2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855 (“The general purpose of a constitutional amendment is not an inter-
pretive riddle.  Text and historical context should make the purpose of most amendments ap-
parent.  A plain reading of the text of the amendment will usually reveal a general, unified 
purpose.  A court might also find other extrinsic contextual sources helpful in determining 
what the amendment sought to change or affirm, including the previous constitutional struc-
ture, legislative and public debates over the amendment’s adoption, the title of the joint reso-
lution, the common name for the amendment, the question submitted to the people for a 
vote, legislative enactments following adoption of the amendment, and other such sources.”).  
Also, the court has developed its own line of precedents to which it defaults for particular 
provisions of the constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Abbott Labs., 2012 WI 62, ¶¶ 29–44, 341 Wis. 
2d 510, 816 N.W.2d 145 (analyzing the constitutional provision creating a right to a civil jury 
trial by ascertaining whether a cause of action existed at common law in 1848, and if so, if the 
cause was recognized as “at law” as opposed to in equity (citing Vill. Food & Liquor Mart v. 
H & S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶¶ 10, 13, 15–16, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177)). 
33. State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 138, 341 N.W.2d 668, 676 (1984); see also Davis v. 
Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 556, 480 N.W.2d 460, 481 (1992) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); Ja-
cobs I, 132 Wis. 2d 82, 126, 390 N.W.2d 86, 102–103 (Ct. App. 1986) (Gartzke, P.J., concur-
ring). 
34. Coulee Catholic Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶ 57, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868 
(“The authoritative, and usually final, indicator of the meaning of a provision is the text—the 
actual words used.”); Jacobs v. Major (Jacobs II), 139 Wis. 2d 492, 504, 407 N.W.2d 832, 837 
(1987) (“We need go no further than holding that Art. I, sec. 3 has [a] plain, unambiguous 
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 99 
whelming majority of its cases the court considers all three elements.35  
When considering the first element, “[t]he plain meaning of the words is 
best discerned by understanding their obvious and ordinary meaning at 
the time the provision was adopted.”36  Dictionaries remain standard 
tools of interpretation.37  Sometimes the words are used elsewhere in the 
 
meaning . . . .”); Jacobs I, 132 Wis. 2d at 126 (Gartzke, P.J., concurring); accord Nat’l Pride at 
Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 540 (Mich. 2008) (“When the language of a 
constitutional provision is unambiguous, resort to extrinsic evidence is prohibited . . . .”); see 
also State ex rel. Kuehne v. Burdette, 2009 WI 119, ¶ 9, 320 Wis. 2d 784, 772 N.W.2d 225 (“To 
discern the meaning of these provisions, ‘[c]ourts should give priority to the plain meaning of 
the words of [the] provision in the context used.’” (quoting Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. 
v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 117, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408)); Erik LeRoy, Comment, The 
Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the Wisconsin Constitution: Old History, New 
Interpretation, Buse v. Smith Criticized, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1325, 1337–38 (suggesting that the 
court look to history and legislative action only if plain meaning is absent); cf In re Jerrell 
C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶ 73, 238 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (suggesting that plain meaning is the 
best source for interpretation). 
35. Cases list all three elements on an equal footing.  See, e.g., Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 19, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408; League of Women 
Voters v. Walker, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 31, 348 Wis. 2d 714, 834 N.W.2d 393; Thomas ex rel. Gram-
ling v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, ¶ 122, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523; Schilling v. Wis. Crime 
Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶ 16, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623; Wis. Citizens Con-
cerned for Cranes & Doves v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 2004 WI 40, ¶ 44, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 
677 N.W.2d 612; State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 64 n.29, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785; 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; Wagner v. Milwaukee 
Cnty. Election Comm’n, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 18, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816; In re John Doe 
Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, ¶ 27, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260; Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 
93, ¶ 30, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388; State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 18, 232 
Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526; Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123, 127 
(1996); Polk Cnty. v. State Pub. Defender, 188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389, 392 (1994); 
State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 361, 441 N.W.2d 696, 699 (1989); Kukor v. 
Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 485, 436 N.W.2d 568, 574 (1989); Beno, 116 Wis. 2d at 136–37; 
Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1, Belleville, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 657, 251 N.W.2d 822, 826 (1977); State 
v. Burke, 2002 WI App 291, ¶ 4, 258 Wis. 2d 832, 653 N.W.2d 922; see also State v. Popenha-
gen, 2008 WI 55, ¶ 209, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611 (Roggensack, J., dissenting); Kocken 
v. Wis. Council 40, 2007 WI 72, ¶ 85, 301 Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828 (Roggensack, J., dis-
senting); State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 58, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (Prosser, J., 
concurring) (describing it as “a well-established methodology for interpreting provisions of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.”); State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 
165 n.3, 401 N.W.2d 782, 802 n.3 (1987) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).  But see State v. Williams, 
2012 WI 59, ¶ 65, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (listing 
the three sources, Chief Justice Abrahamson noted, “[t]his list of sources for or approaches to 
constitutional interpretation is not exhaustive”). 
36. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 117 (Prosser, J., dissenting); see also 
Burke, 2002 WI App 291, ¶ 4 (“[W]e may not read our 1848 constitution using modern defini-
tions and syntax.”). 
37. See Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 120–21 (Prosser, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Noah Webster’s an American Dictionary); Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 65 (quoting 
from Black’s Law Dictionary, Random House Unabridged Dictionary, and The American 
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100 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
constitution, or earlier cases interpret the same words.38  At times, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court looks to the decisions of other state courts 
when considering how to interpret words in the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion.39  In rare instances, a technical term is interpreted in line with its 
technical definition.40 
When conducting a historical analysis of text from the 1848 constitu-
tion, the court continues to rely primarily on records from the drafting 
conventions.41  The court may also consider contemporaneous practices 
 
Heritage Dictionary); Polk Cnty., 188 Wis. 2d at 676 (quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary); 
Bd. of Educ. v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 182, 222 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1974) (quoting from Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged). 
38. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 20–24 (looking to earlier cases); Risser v. Klauser, 
207 Wis. 2d 176, 199, 558 N.W.2d 108, 117 (1997) (“Although the interpretation of a word 
used in a constitutional provision is not determinative of the word’s meaning in all constitu-
tional provisions, it may prove helpful.”). 
39. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 39 (“Our established constitutional analysis includes an exami-
nation of the practices in effect at the time the amendment was passed.  Following the lead of 
the legislature, we have looked to the practices and interpretations of other states.”); Jacobs 
II, 139 Wis. 2d at 514–19 (looking at similar cases analyzing cognate provisions from Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Michigan, New York, and Washington).  But see Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 54 
(“The effort of tracing the evolution of these clauses in other states is not warranted, because, 
as we have discussed, our state has its own constitutional history that developed the provision 
we today examine.”). 
40. State ex rel. Allis v. Wiesner, 187 Wis. 384, 394, 204 N.W. 589, 593 (1925) (“[W]here 
technical terms were in use prior to the adoption of the constitution, such terms were used in 
the constitution in the sense in which they were understood at common law.”); accord Mich. 
Coal. of State Emp. Unions v Mich. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 634 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Mich. 2001) 
(“[I]f a constitutional phrase is a technical legal term or a phrase of art in the law, the phrase 
will be given the meaning that those sophisticated in the law understood at the time of enact-
ment unless it is clear from the constitutional language that some other meaning was intend-
ed.”); cf State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(“[T]echnical or specially-defined words or phrases [in statutes] are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning.” (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶¶ 8, 20, 260 Wis. 
2d 663, 660 N.W.2d 656)). 
41. Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 61 (“The debates are our best information about the prac-
tices at the time the constitution was adopted.”); City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 27 (quoting 
from drafters at the 1848 convention); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 685–90, 546 
N.W.2d 123, 129–31 (1996) (quoting from several different delegates to the 1846 and 1848 
conventions); State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 140, 341 N.W.2d 668, 677 (1984) (“To help clari-
fy the meaning of section 16 we look to the constitutional debates.”); Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 
2d 550, 570–71, 247 N.W.2d 141, 150–51 (1976) (quoting Experience Estabrook, chairman of 
the committee on education, during the convention’s debate on the education article); see also 
In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶¶ 75–78, 238 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (looking to two 
early Wisconsin Supreme Court cases when the court’s membership included delegates to the 
drafting convention); Jacobs I, 132 Wis. 2d 82, 100, 390 N.W.2d 86, 92 (Ct. App. 1986) (begin-
ning by attempting, and failing, to find any “clues as to the source of or intent of the framers” 
in the debates of the 1846 and 1848 conventions). 
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in Wisconsin and other states.42 
When looking at amendments to the constitution rather than origi-
nal text, the court considers legislative history from the amendment’s 
drafting and passage through the legislature as well as popular history 
from the statewide ratification campaign.43  Wisconsin has few sources of 
legislative history because the legislature does not transcribe its floor 
sessions or committee hearings.44  Sources of history used by courts in 
constitutional cases include Legislative Council memoranda and re-
ports;45 Legislative Reference Bureau drafting files and analyses;46 analy-
 
42. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶¶ 18–22, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (describing 
past practice on the federal level, in Wisconsin, and in Illinois); Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶¶ 123–
25 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (considering past practice in Wisconsin); id. ¶ 64 (majority opin-
ion) (looking to an analogous provision from Illinois). 
43. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 117, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 
N.W.2d 408 (“This principle permits courts to consider the debates surrounding amendments 
to the constitution and the circumstances at the time these amendments were adopt-
ed. . . .  These concerns are often illuminated by contemporary debates and explanations of 
the provision both inside and outside legislative chambers.” (citations omitted)); Schilling v. 
Wis. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶ 16, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623 (“We have 
broadly understood the second of these sources, the constitutional debates and practices in 
existence contemporaneous to the writing, to include the general history relating to a consti-
tutional amendment, as well as the legislative history of the amendment.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
44. MICHAEL J. KEANE, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, WIS. BRIEFS NO. 06-10, 
RESEARCHING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN WISCONSIN 1 (July 2006), available at http://www.l
egis.state.wi.us/LRB/pubs/wb/06wb10.pdf.  But see Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 69 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring) (listing thirteen different sources of history the court has available for statu-
tory interpretation); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 999–1000 (4th ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION] (noting that state legislative history is becoming in-
creasing accessible to lawyers and judges through online resources). 
45. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 54 (considering a report by the Legislative Council); Dairy-
land Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 32; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 36 n.12, 264 Wis. 
2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (“While the research done by [the Legislative Council and Legislative 
Reference Bureau] is not necessarily dispositive in determining legislative intent, their anal-
yses at the time of drafting certainly provides the court with valuable information about the 
knowledge available to legislators.  Further, the legal expertise of these agencies entitles their 
analysis to some consideration by this court.”); Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 38 (considering a re-
port by the Legislative Council); In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, ¶ 34, 260 Wis. 2d 
653, 660 N.W.2d 260; Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶¶ 50, 52, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 
N.W.2d 666; see also Jeffrey Monks, Comment, The End of Gun Control or Protection 
Against Tyranny?: The Impact of the New Wisconsin Constitutional Right to Bear Arms on 
State Gun Control Laws, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 249, 280 (2001) (“Because this [Legislative Coun-
cil] memorandum was read by many legislators and is part of the amendment’s official draft-
ing record, the conclusions in it should be considered a strong indicator of legislative intent.”). 
46. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 51 (drafting files); Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 
107, ¶¶ 31–32 (drafting files); Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶¶ 22 & n.7 (analysis); Cole, 2003 WI 
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sis by other legislative staffers;47 statements by sponsoring legislators and 
other drafters and supporters;48 other sources used as models or exam-
ples by the drafters;49 opinions rendered by the attorney general;50 the 
attorney general’s explanatory statement;51 and changes between ver-
sions of the amendment under legislative consideration,52 including ac-
cepted and rejected amendments.53  It is generally accepted that, in re-
viewing this history, the court should focus on statements by legislators 
and advocates who framed and favored the amendment.54  This is so not 
 
112, ¶¶ 36 & n.12 (drafting files); Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 35 (analysis). 
47. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 35 (citing a memorandum from the 
Assembly Democratic Caucus deputy director). 
48. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶¶ 49–51 (considering the report of the Governor’s Citizen 
Study Commission on court reorganization); Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, 
¶ 210 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (quoting a news release from the governor who called the spe-
cial session to pass the amendment); Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶ 22 (quoting a county supervisor 
who was publicly supportive of the amendment); Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 64 (Prosser, J., concur-
ring) (considering statements by sponsoring legislator); Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 62 (quoting 
anonymous letters to the editor); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 692, 546 N.W.2d 123, 
132 (1996) (considering letters written by the superintendent of public instruction concerning 
an amendment he drafted affecting the position); id. at 701–03 (Wilcox, J., concurring) (look-
ing to additional letters from the superintendent); State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Bd., 133 Wis. 
2d 87, 94–95, 394 N.W.2d 732, 735–36 (1986) (considering a passage from a treatise written by 
two members of the Judicial Council concerning the court reorganization amendment); Ap-
pling, 2013 WI App 3, ¶¶ 49–55 (considering newspaper and press-release quotations from 
sponsoring legislators); see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 1018–19 (discuss-
ing the use of history generated by the executive branch, interest groups, and law-reform or-
ganizations). 
49. Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶ 18 (citing two law review articles that accompanied the sena-
tor’s drafting request to the Legislative Reference Bureau); State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 
WI 9, ¶ 31, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 (citing a statute known to have been used by the 
revisor of Wisconsin’s statute). 
50. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 34; id. ¶¶ 145–54, 229–30 (Prosser, 
J., dissenting). 
51. Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶¶ 36, 40. 
52. Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶ 20; Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶¶ 67–68, 70–71 (Prosser, J., concur-
ring). 
53. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 216–20 (Prosser, J., dissenting); 
Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶ 20; see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 1026 (dis-
cussing use of rejected provisions as a type of legislative history).  But see Dairyland Grey-
hound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 28 n.27 (majority opinion) (“[T]he rejection of this amend-
ment is only one act by the legislature, and does not outweigh the vast majority of other 
legislative records and news reports . . . .”). 
54. State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 55, 7 N.W.2d 375, 381 (1942) (indicating that 
the court should “find out, if possible, the real meaning and substantial purpose of those who 
adopted it.” (emphasis added)); Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 44 n.10, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 
826 N.W.2d 666 (agreeing with plaintiffs that “‘the views of an amendment’s proponents are 
usually privileged over those of its opponents’” (quoting Martin, 242 Wis. 41 at 55)); id. ¶ 47 
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 103 
only because opposing legislators and groups did not write the amend-
ment, but because they had an incentive to distort its impact in their at-
tempt to defeat it.55 
The debates and explanations of the provision during the statewide 
ratification campaign are also used to illuminate a clause.56  The court 
operates on the presumption that, “when informed, the citizens of Wis-
consin are familiar with the elements of the constitution and with the 
laws, and that the information used to educate the voters during the rati-
fication campaign provides evidence of the voters’ intent.”57  To discern 
the voters’ intent, the court uses several sources, primarily newspaper 
stories,58 columns,59 and editorials.60  It has also looked at public opinion 
 
(“[T]he more reasonable and obvious conclusion is that voters who ended up favoring the 
amendment were, generally speaking, persuaded by statements of the proponents . . . .”); see 
also id. ¶¶ 43–45 (mentioning that opponent statements are relevant only when they “reflect 
a congruence of views or a common core understanding of the meaning or impact of the 
amendment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
55. Monks, supra note 45, at 293; see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 
1021 (“[S]tatements by legislators about bills they oppose are not reliable . . . .” (citing NLRB 
v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964))).  Compare Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. 
Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 541 (Mich. 2008) (“[I]t is no more likely that the voters 
relied on ‘proponents views rather than opponents’ views of the amendment.”), with id. at 548 
n.35 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (“[I]n determining a law’s meaning, one logically assumes that the 
statements of its drafters and lead supporters carry more weight than the concerns of those 
who voted against it.”). 
56. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 117 (Prosser, J., dissenting); see also 
Cathy R. Silak, The People Act, the Courts React: A Proposed Model for Interpreting Initia-
tives in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 37 (1996) (“It is the voters’ intent, not merely that of the 
drafters or proponents of the initiative, that the court must ascertain.”).  But see Glenn C. 
Smith, Solving the “Initiatory Construction” Puzzle (and Improving Direct Democracy) by 
Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor Intent, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 257–59, 275 (2007) (ar-
guing that courts should deemphasize voter intent and instead focus more on sponsor intent 
when interpreting statewide initiatives). 
57. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 37. 
58. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 53, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (citing a story 
from the Wisconsin State Journal); Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 61 n.38 
(quoting from a story in the Milwaukee Sentinel); id. ¶ 234 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (quoting 
from stories in the Milwaukee Journal and Wisconsin State Journal); Appling, 2013 WI App 3, 
¶ 58 (citing a supporter’s quote in a newspaper story).  Admittedly, there are other news out-
lets than newspapers.  However, “the print media generally supply the most extensive cover-
age” of these elections.  See Joseph D. Kearney & Howard B. Eisenberg, The Print Media and 
Judicial Elections: Some Case Studies from Wisconsin, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 593, 596 (2002).  
Moreover, 
[I]t is a straightforward (albeit time-consuming) matter to reassemble newspaper 
and other printed coverage after the fact.  By contrast, tracking all media cover-
age—both print and electronic—would require a massive, ex ante campaign that 
covered every moment and media source beginning some time well before the elec-
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104 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
polling from the ratification campaign.61 
In all events, “[t]he framers’ intent . . . has special significance when 
we are dealing with a matter which was demonstrably contemplated by 
the framers.”62  Similarly, the court may also consider whether there ex-
ists “a long-standing, uniform and continuous interpretation of a consti-
tutional provision” that stretches from the provision’s proposal to the 
present.63 
Looking to contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous legislative 
constructions of an amendment is usually straightforward.  “The legisla-
ture’s subsequent actions are a crucial component of any constitutional 
analysis because they are clear evidence of the legislature’s understand-
ing of that amendment.”64 
This entire interpretive enterprise is undertaken seeking “to give ef-
fect to the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted 
it . . . [and to construe it] so as to promote the objects for which [it was] 
framed and adopted.”65  This section has traced the historical evolution 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s approach to interpretation of the 
state constitution, from the framing era through the Busé framework in 
modern times. 
III. THE WEAKNESS OF THE COURT’S CURRENT METHOD 
The second prong of the Busé methodology looks at history from the 
 
tion and lasting right up to it. 
Id. at 597.  But see Appling, 2013 WI App 3, ¶¶ 59–60 (quoting from the website of an 
amendment supporter, then quoting from a television appearance by another amendment 
supporter). 
59. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 40–41 (quoting from a letter to 
the editor by two senators published in the Milwaukee Journal and a column by a Wisconsin 
State Journal writer); Appling, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 58 (quoting from a newspaper op-ed by an 
amendment supporter published in a University of Wisconsin–Madison student newspaper). 
60. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 41–42 (quoting from editorials in 
the Wisconsin State Journal, Eau Claire Leader Telegram, and Green Bay Press Gazette). 
61. Id. ¶ 43; State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 144, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 44, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 
328; see also Monks, supra note 45, at 284 n.195. 
62. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 362, 441 N.W.2d 696, 699 (1989). 
63. Id. at 362. 
64. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 45; see also State v. Williams, 2012 
WI 59, ¶ 55, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (considering legislation passed in the session 
immediately following the amendment’s passage). 
65. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 10 (quoting Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 
729–30, 150 N.W.2d 447, 452 (1967)). 
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 105 
amendment’s passage through two sessions of the legislature and from 
the statewide ratification campaign.66  Chief Justice Shirley Abraham-
son, in her concurring opinion in Kalal, wrote, “Legislative history, es-
pecially legislative committee reports and the congressional record, has 
gotten a bad reputation in recent years in federal circles because legisla-
tive history may be manufactured by both proponents and opponents of 
the legislation . . . .”67  Although she tries to reassure us that the “manu-
facturing of legislative history is a less well-known and less perfected 
skill” in Wisconsin,68 she provides no support to justify her distinction 
between federal legislative history, which she poo-poos, and state legis-
lative history, which she positively advocates.  Ken Dortzbach observed 
in 1996 that “state courts do not hear as many politically-charged cas-
es[,] which typically lend themselves to abuse or misuse of legislative 
history.”69  Since he wrote that, the court has used legislative history 
when deciding major constitutional cases dealing with gun rights and 
gambling, and it may soon do so regarding same-sex unions.70  These 
hot-button issues requiring interpretation of relatively recent amend-
ments offer interested parties the opportunity and incentive to manufac-
ture and manipulate legislative history. 
Courts’ experience with federal legislative history provides insight 
into the dangers Wisconsin courts can expect.  First, Judge Ken Starr has 
said that “technocrats, lobbyists and attorneys have created a virtual 
cottage industry in fashioning legislative history so that the Congress 
will appear to embrace their particular view in a given statute.”71  Ad-
mittedly, not as much legislative history comes out of the state legisla-
ture,72 but the possibility and incentives are certainly present for legisla-
 
66. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568–70, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149–51 (1976). 
67. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 66, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
68. Id. ¶ 67. 
69. Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and 
Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 
161, 201 (1996). 
70. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 195–96, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 
719 N.W.2d 408 (discussing gambling); Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 20 (discussing gun rights); Ap-
pling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 11, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666 (discussing same-sex 
unions). 
71. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE 
L.J. 371, 377; see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 983 (discussing the “smug-
gling in” problem presented by committee reports); id. at 1000–01 (discussing intentionally 
distortionary sponsor statements). 
72. KEANE, supra note 44, at 1. 
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tors, staff, and lobbyists to mold that which does exist in a particular di-
rection. 
Second, once the legislation is passed and its history made, then law-
yers and judges are tempted to “find[] in the legislative history only that 
for which one is looking.”73  Thus, as Chief Justice Abrahamson ob-
served in Mortier v. Town of Casey, a judge’s use of legislative history 
“is akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”74  She 
quoted approvingly from an opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski: “[T]he 
fact of the matter is that legislative history can be cited to support al-
most any proposition, and frequently is.”75  She reiterated this point in 
Kalal, observing that “often every position can be buttressed by some-
thing in the federal legislative history.”76  And she returned to it nearly a 
decade later in State v. Williams: “[T]here are often different historical 
narratives, and there is the ever-present danger that history can be read 
selectively to support a particular result.”77 
The third problem with legislative history is that even for those 
without an agenda, simply sorting through it can be a complicated task, 
and those who undertake the analysis dispassionately often end up with 
conflicting, vague, or otherwise inconclusive history.78  Justices can and 
often do disagree about the proper implications of legislative history 
when interpreting a constitutional or statutory provision.79 
 
73. Starr, supra note 71, at 376.  The majority focused on different reasons to oppose 
legislative history, but did note that more extensive use of legislative history “renders the 
analysis more vulnerable to subjectivity.”  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, 
¶ 49 n.8, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
74. Mortier v. Town of Casey, 154 Wis. 2d 18, 39, 452 N.W.2d 555, 564 (1990) (Abra-
hamson, J., dissenting) (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legisla-
tive History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)); ESKRIDGE, 
LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 972–73; see also Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶ 60, 315 Wis. 
2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (“Thus resort to a dictionary can be, 
as Justice Scalia has written of the use of legislative history, ‘the equivalent of entering a 
crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s friends.’” (citing 
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
75. Mortier, 154 Wis. 2d at 39–40 (quoting Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 
(9th Cir. 1986)). 
76. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 66 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
77. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 85, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring). 
78. Starr, supra note 71, at 378–79. 
79. See, e.g., Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 225–34, 295 
Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority on how to 
read legislative history regarding the lottery amendments); Wagner v. Milwaukee Cnty. Elec-
tion Comm’n, 2003 WI 103, ¶¶ 89–91, 94–95, 100, 105–07, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816 
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 107 
Fourth, the use of legislative history to discern the “intent” of the 
legislative body operates on the mistaken assumption that a single, uni-
fied intent exists.  Yet this is plainly not so, whether the body under ex-
amination is the U.S. Congress with its 535 members or the Wisconsin 
Legislature with its 132.  In either instance, “A legislature certainly has 
no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or 
three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard 
to which many of the approving majority might have had, and often de-
monstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.”80  Numerous diverse 
interests drive legislators to cast their individual votes on a particular 
bill.81  No number of committee reports or floor speeches will prove 
what a majority of the body believed or intended at the time the bill was 
passed82—only the law itself was the subject of agreement. 
Taking all this into account, Chief Justice Abrahamson concluded in 
Mortier that “[c]ourts must use federal legislative history with healthy 
skepticism.”83  The same should be said of legislative history from the 
Wisconsin Legislature. 
A healthy skepticism should also characterize a court’s approach to 
popular history from the statewide ratification campaign.  Popular histo-
ry suffers the same four flaws as legislative history.  First, it can be stra-
tegically created during the campaign to influence later judicial interpre-
 
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority on how to read statements from dele-
gates to the constitutional conventions); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 701–05, 546 
N.W.2d 123, 135–37 (1996) (Wilcox, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority on how to 
read several letters by the drafter of a constitutional amendment); Grosse v. Protective Life 
Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 97, 117–20, 513 N.W.2d 592, 601–02 (1994) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with the majority on how to read legislative history from the state legislature); 
Mortier, 154 Wis. 2d at 41–44 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority on 
how to read legislative history from Congress).  See generally Dortzbach, supra note 69, at 
201–21 (examining conflicting use of legislative history by majority, concurring, and dissenting 
justices within various cases). 
80. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930); see also Jane 
S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 
YALE L.J. 107, 123 (1995) (“Dating to the work of Max Radin, intent-based statutory inter-
pretation has been the subject of continuous scholarly derision.”). 
81. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998); see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 54–
60 (discussing public-choice theory, log-rolling, and coalition creation); Clifford J. Carrubba 
& Craig Volden, Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions, 44 AM. J. OF 
POLITICAL SCI. 261, 262 (2000). 
82. Especially because committee and conference reports are usually written by staff and 
only represent the views of the chairman of the committee or conference from which they 
emerge, not the legislative body as a whole.  Starr, supra note 71, at 375–76 & n.14. 
83. Mortier, 154 Wis. 2d at 40 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
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tation.84 
Second, it can be sifted through or manipulated by an advocate or 
judge to support his or her preferred outcome in a case.85  If substantial 
legislative history is available for an average bill in Congress, imagine 
the amount of popular history generated by a yearlong statewide cam-
paign across Wisconsin, a state with thirty-one daily newspapers, scores 
of other newspapers and magazines, hundreds of television and radio 
outlets,86 and multi-million dollar campaigns.87 
Third, even well-meaning people will likely find much of the popular 
history confusing or in conflict with itself.88  As Professor Jane Schacter, 
writing while a member of the University of Wisconsin law faculty, has 
argued, “Judicial immersion in the unwieldy body of images, words, and 
political slogans that may comprise the media coverage and advertising 
related to a ballot measure is likely to intensify, not reduce, the prob-
lems of indeterminacy that already undermine the search for popular in-
tent.”89  It may also be that the popular history was distorted by political 
forces trying to shape, or misshape, voters’ perception of the amend-
ment. 90 
Fourth and finally, this endeavor starts from the flawed assumption 
that popular history can provide a guide to the “intent” of the voters.91  
 
84. Schacter, supra note 80, at 145 (“[A]ssigning a central place to media sources invites 
strategic behavior on the part of partisans in the initiative battle, such as attempts to fill the 
airwaves and the larger public record with characterizations and claims intended to influence 
subsequent judicial interpretation.”). 
85. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State Constitutional History: A Case Note, 53 
ALB. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989). 
86. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE 
BOOK 2011–2012, at 770–84 (2011) (listing media outlets in Wisconsin). 
87. See, e.g., Groups that Weighed in On the 2006 Fall Referendum Questions, 
WISCONSIN DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.wisdc.org/referendumgrou
ps2006.php (estimating that groups for and against the Wisconsin Marriage Amendment 
spent over $5 million to affect the statewide ratification referendum). 
88. Silak, supra note 56, at 41 (“Despite a court’s careful attention to all the extrinsic 
aids . . . the intent behind an initiative may remain obscure.”). 
89. Schacter, supra note 80, at 144. 
90. Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 542 n.24 (Mich. 
2008) (“It perhaps can also be discerned that supporters of legislative and constitutional initi-
atives often tend to downplay the effect of such initiatives during public debate, while oppo-
nents tend to overstate their effect.”). 
91. Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 
17, 18 (1997) (“[I]t seems unlikely that judges can accurately discern the ‘popular intent’ or 
even that such a clear, monolithic intent actually exists.”); id. at 28 (“There is no principled 
way to impute a clear, consistent, or illuminating intent to the electorate.”); Schacter, supra 
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 109 
As Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas wryly observed, 
“[I]nquiries into legislative intent are even more difficult than usual 
when the legislative body whose unified intent must be determined con-
sists of 825,162 Arkansas voters.”92 
In addition to these four problems, popular history from ratification 
campaigns faces its own unique problems.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court relies primarily on newspaper reports, columns, and editorials for 
the popular history of the ratification campaign.  Yet, especially in an 
era where newspapers are in decline, the reality is that television and 
radio advertising “take[] on greater importance as the primary means of 
voter persuasion.”93  But even if the court were to start looking at cam-
paign ads and materials as part of its analysis,94 it would find that they 
are “frequently too diffuse, disparate, indeterminate, or biased to be ef-
fective as judicial sources of popular intent.”95  Moreover, these cam-
paign materials rarely “traffic in ‘the arcane, albeit potent, details’ of the 
initiatives they tout or disparage.”96 
Courts in Wisconsin and elsewhere have recognized the problems 
inherent in reliance on popular history to discern voter intent.  The Su-
preme Court of Missouri, for instance, has labeled “representations 
made here and there at large over the state by private individuals and 
organizations in advocacy of a cause at an election” as “neither conclu-
sive nor persuasive evidence” for interpretation.97  The Supreme Court 
 
note 80, at 111 (“First, the popular intent behind an initiative statute is largely illusory and 
provides an unstable anchor for judicial interpretation.”); id. at 124–25 (“[T]he problem of 
aggregating multiple individual intentions, substantial as it is in the context of the legislative 
process, is compounded by the daunting scale of direct lawmaking.  Even if we granted that 
individual voter intent existed—a dubious premise, I will argue—courts simply could not cu-
mulate what may be millions of voter intentions.”).  Thus, courts which seek “some mean in-
tent of the average reasonable informed voter” rely on a “misguided faith.”  Stephen Salvuc-
ci, Note, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: The Interpretation of Initiatives in 
California, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 877 (1998).  Professor Smith finds a “clear consensus of 
initiatory-construction scholarship” that the search for an “intent of the voters” is “funda-
mentally bankrupt” because this mythical intent “does not exist.”  Smith, supra note 56, at 
258. 
92. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 921 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
93. Silak, supra note 56, at 31; see also Schacter, supra note 80, at 131, 135. 
94. As has been suggested by Christopher R. McFadden, Article, The Wisconsin Bear 
Arms Amendment and the Case Against an Absolute Prohibition on Carrying Concealed 
Weapons, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 709, 711 (1999). 
95. Schacter, supra note 80, at 130; see also Silak, supra note 56, at 29 (“As with any ad-
vertising campaign, the meaning and effect of an initiative can be subject to distortion.”). 
96. Smith, supra note 56, at 275 (quoting Schacter, supra note 80, at 158). 
97. State ex rel. Russell v. State Highway Comm’n, 42 S.W.2d 196, 202 (Mo. 1931); see 
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of Arkansas followed a similar rule, reasoning, 
When the debates arose over the question of adoption by the 
people, the amendment had already been framed by the Legisla-
ture and referred to the people; and the opinions expressed dur-
ing the progress of the campaign did not enter into the shaping of 
the language of the amendment, so as to shed light on its intend-
ed meaning.98 
Chief Justice Nathan Heffernan, writing for the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, similarly declined to ascribe any significance to a brief written by 
the chief of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library in support of a 
proposed amendment, saying: 
[W]e question whether contemporaneously written briefs aimed 
at garnering political support for a proposed constitutional 
amendment can ever be considered persuasive when a court later 
attempts to interpret the constitutional provision that was 
amended.  Even if Witte could accurately be called the drafter of 
this amendment, the amendment to the constitution was accom-
plished in the usual manner, including passage by two successive 
legislatures and approval and ratification by the people of Wis-
consin at the general election.  Thus, unlike the situation where 
the court must ascertain legislative intent for a statutory enact-
ment, this contemporaneously written account of what Witte 
thought the proposed constitutional amendment meant, is not 
persuasive as to what the amendment actually did.99 
Today’s Wisconsin courts would be wise to recall Chief Justice Hef-
fernan’s words, and those of other state high courts, in rejecting the use 
of popular history as a first resort for interpretation. 
In addition to newspaper stories, the other place the court has 
looked when discerning the intent of the voters is public opinion poll-
ing.100  The experience of the U.S. Supreme Court in citing opinion polls 
 
also St. Louis Cnty. v. State Highway Comm’n, 409 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. 1966); Missourians 
for Honest Elections v. Mo. Elections Comm’n, 536 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
98. Hodges v. Dawdy, 149 S.W. 656, 659 (Ark. 1912); see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, 
supra note 44, at 1035–43 (discussing post-enactment legislative history). 
99. State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 461 n.18, 424 N.W.2d 385, 
397 n.18 (1988) (citations omitted). 
100. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 43, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 
N.W.2d 408; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 44, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; State v. 
Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 144, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissent-
ing); see also Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 547–48 (Mich. 
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 111 
reveals the significant problems with judicial reliance on unexamined 
survey data.  In Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion mentioned in a footnote “polling data show[ing] a widespread 
consensus among Americans, even those who support the death penalty, 
that executing the mentally retarded is wrong.”101  Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, in dissent, gave a critique of polling data that the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court should carefully consider: 
An extensive body of social science literature describes how 
methodological and other errors can affect the reliability and va-
lidity of estimates about the opinions and attitudes of a popula-
tion derived from various sampling techniques.  Everything from 
variations in the survey methodology, such as the choice of the 
target population, the sampling design used, the questions asked, 
and the statistical analyses used to interpret the data can skew 
the results.102 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that in a previous decision involv-
ing the death penalty, the Court had refused to “rest constitutional law 
upon such uncertain foundations as public opinion polls.”103  In another 
 
2008) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (discussing a poll on domestic-partnership benefits and same-sex 
marriage taken in advance of Michigan’s statewide vote on a constitutional amendment); 
Cnty. of Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt., Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 407–13, 588 N.W.2d 236, 252–55 
(1999) (setting standards of evidence for the admission of polling data to show “community 
standards of decency” in obscenity cases); Monks, supra note 45, at 284 n.195. 
101. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (citing Brief of Am. Ass’n on Men-
tal Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support for Petitioner at 3a–7a, McCarver v. North 
Carolina, 548 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 533 U.S. 975 
(2001) (No. 00-1015) (appending approximately twenty state and national polls on the issue), 
also appended to Atkins, 536 U.S. at 328–37 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)). 
102. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 326–27 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief Justice further 
noted that while criteria exist to determine whether surveys possess sufficient scientific merit 
to justify their use in court, they ought to be introduced at the trial court level where the poll-
sters can be credentialed as experts, examined, and cross-examined.  Id. at. 327–28.  Instead, 
these polls were submitted as part of an amicus brief, which may raise concerns that the ami-
cus filer was using the polling to advance an agenda.  See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, 
The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 91, 97 (1993) (examining problems caused by amicus practice).  For a broader discus-
sion of the Chief Justice’s concerns about polling methodology, see Tracy E. Robinson, By 
Popular Demand? The Supreme Court’s Use of Public Opinion Polls in Atkins v. Virginia, 14 
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 107, 121–37 (2004).  For a defense of polling in reply to the 
Chief Justice’s concerns, see David Niven, Jeremy Zilber & Kenneth W. Miller, A “Feeble 
Effort to Fabricate National Consensus”: The Supreme Court’s Measurement of Current Social 
Attitudes Regarding the Death Penalty, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2006). 
103. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989)); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 352 n.5 (1976) (White, 
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death-penalty case, the Court noted but declined to rely on public opin-
ion polling, saying, “The public sentiment expressed in these and other 
polls and resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which 
is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we can re-
ly.”104  The text of the amendment that voters approved is the “objective 
indicator” of the desires of the people, not opinion polling. 
Moreover, the reliability of the pollsters that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court has relied upon in the past is widely questioned by expert observ-
ers of Wisconsin politics.  In Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., the court 
cited polls by St. Norbert College (SNC)/Wisconsin Public Radio and 
the University of Wisconsin Extension.105  In State v. Cole and State v. 
Hamdan, the justices looked to two polls sponsored by the Public Policy 
Forum, a non-profit think tank based in Milwaukee.106  The publicly 
available polling data on the marriage amendment and its impact on civ-
il unions, cited by then-Attorney General Peg Lautenschlager and Uni-
versity of Wisconsin (UW) Law Professor David Schwartz in their opin-
ion letters on domestic partnerships,107 come from SNC and the UW 
Madison Survey Center (UWSC).108 
 
J., dissenting) (“[N]either the parties here nor amici rely on such polls as relevant to the issue 
before us.”). 
104. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334–35 (1989). 
105. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 43. 
106. State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 144, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (Abraham-
son, C.J., dissenting); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 44, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; see 
also Monks, supra note 45, at 284 n.196 (mentioning Public Policy Forum’s role in conducting 
polls). 
107. Letter from Peggy A. Lautenschlager, Attorney Gen., Wis. Dep’t of Justice, to Mi-
chael P. May, City Attorney, City of Madison, 5 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013), www.news.wisc.ed
u/domesticPartnerBenefits/images/AGOpinion.pdf; Letter from David S. Schwartz, Professor 
of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., to James E. Doyle, Governor, State of 
Wis., 6 (June 4, 2009), http://web.archive.org/web/20090822184959/http://www.wisgov.state.wi.
us/docview.asp?docid=17476 (accessed by entering URL in the Internet Archive). 
108. G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger Poll No. 14, Release No. 5, 
Courts, Homosexuality, and Gay Marriage, 6–8 (Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.uwsc.wisc. 
edu/badg145.pdf; G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger Poll No. 10, Re-
lease No. 6, Homosexuality and the Law: The View from Wisconsin, 5–9 (Sept. 19, 2003), 
http://www.uwsc.wisc.edu/badg106.pdf.; Wendy Scattergood, St. Norbert Coll. Survey Ctr., 
Gay Marriage and Civil Unions, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Spring 2006), http://www.wpr.org/april-
gay-marriage-civil-unions-2006; Katherine Cramer Walsh, Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger 
Poll No. 22, Release No. 3, Same Sex Marriage, Unions, and Referendum, 1–2 (July 17, 2006), 
http://www.uwsc.wisc.edu/BP22PressRelease_Death_Samesex.pdf; Katherine Cramer Walsh, 
Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger Poll No. 23, Release No. 1, Wisconsin Statewide Elections 
November 2006, 18, 30 (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.uwsc.wisc.edu/BP23PressRelease1_WIr 
aces_111406.pdf.  The October 2006 polling memorandum from UWSC references polls taken 
in December 2003 and January 2005, but the full results from those polls are not available on 
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 113 
Each of these polls surveyed Wisconsin residents generally, not reg-
istered or likely voters.109  Marquette Law School Professor Charles 
Franklin distinguishes the two, saying that a poll of residents is “a sam-
ple that is most representative of the state but not necessarily repre-
sentative of November voters.”110  Critiquing a similar poll, longtime 
Wisconsin Democratic political consultant Bill Christofferson wrote sar-
castically, “It is customary, when doing a poll to try to find out what’s 
happening in an election campaign, to ask people who actually intend to 
vote.”111  It is also the goal of the court to find out what the voters, and 
not merely the people who lived in the state, believed about an amend-
ment at referendum.112  Second, Wisconsin college polls usually are in 
the field for eleven or twelve days, while professional polls generally 
take two or three.113  Mr. Christofferson said one such poll was “a little 
suspect because [it was] done over a long period of time.”114  Third, be-
cause they try to keep costs down, college polls often use relatively small 
sample sizes,115 resulting in such wide margins of error that Mr. Christof-
 
the UWSC website. 
109. See John Patrick Hunter, Survey: Taxes Top Worry, Gaming Views Split, CAPITAL 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at 3A (SNC and UW Extension polls); Jim Stingl, Gun Amendment 
Favored by 80% in State, but Only 16% Would Back Law on Carrying Concealed Weapons, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 25, 1998, at 1A (discussing Public Policy Forum polls); see 
also supra note 108 (demonstrating survey methodology of marriage amendment polls). 
110. Charles Franklin, When the Pollsters Matter Most: WI Gov 06, POLITICAL 
ARITHMETIK (July 1, 2006, 11:35 AM), http://politicalarithmetik.blogspot.com/2006/07/when-
pollster-matters-most-wi-gov-06.html. 
111. Hey, Kids, Let’s Do a Poll!, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON (Apr. 14, 
2006, 9:01 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2006/04/hey-kids-lets-do-poll.html. 
112. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 37–44, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 
719 N.W.2d 408 (considering perspective of voters when analyzing intent). 
113. Daniel, Most Recent Badger Poll Miserably Flawed, GOP3.COM: THE 
TRIUMVIRATE (July 12, 2006, 11:17 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20070611101404/http://g
op3.com/2006/07/12/badger-poll-timed-trash/ (accessed by entering URL in the Internet Ar-
chive) (comparing four Wisconsin college polls with twelve professional polls taken in Wis-
consin). 
114. Another Day, Another Poll, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON (Nov. 16, 
2005, 11:16 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2005/11/another-day-another-poll.html; 
see also THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON, Hey, Kids, Let’s Do a Poll!, supra note 
111 (saying a SNC poll gives us “blurry photos at best”). 
115. See A Poll You Can Safely Ignore, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON 
(Dec. 10, 2005, 11:57 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2005/12/poll-you-can-safely-
ignore.html (describing a small sample used by Edgewood College as “not enough to tell you 
anything meaningful”); Franklin, supra note 110 (saying the SNC poll uses “small samples”); 
Nate Silver, Today’s Polls: Alaska!, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 10, 2008, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/04/todays-polls-alaska.html (giving “appropriately low 
weighting” to a SNC poll because it “consists of a small sample of just 400 adults (not even 
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114 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
ferson labeled one SNC poll “basically a disservice to any rational polit-
ical discussion.”116  In light of these faults, Mr. Christofferson has criti-
cized the Wisconsin media because they “usually treat all polls equally—
one taken by a college class is as good as one taken by one of the coun-
try’s top political pollsters.”117  In the past, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
has looked to polls taken by a college class;118 it should not do so in the 
future. 
Rather than using college polls with significant reliability issues, the 
court may be tempted to look at professional polls done by organiza-
tions interested in a referendum.  These polls, after all, usually have 
larger samples, screen for likely voters, and are taken over industry-
standard polling windows.119  But the court should avoid these polls as 
well, for three reasons.  First, groups interested in the outcome of a ref-
erendum have a strong incentive to ask the question in such a way as to 
lead respondents to a desired answer.  A poll that exaggerates support 
for the group’s position may be used to create a “bandwagon” effect 
that helps in the poll that really matters on Election Day.120  Second, 
these groups only publicly release polls that show good results; no can-
didate ever gave the media a poll showing him or her getting crushed.  
Third, these releases often offer only broad descriptions and bare de-
tails—not question wording or order.121 
 
registered voters)”); see also John McAdams, Current St. Norbert College Poll: Good News 
for Democrats, MARQUETTE WARRIOR (Oct. 20, 2006, 2:03 PM), http://mu-
warriorblogspot.com/20 06/10/current-st-norbert-college-poll-good.html (questioning whether 
the SNC sample has a bias). 
116. Margin of Error Leads all Candidates, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON 
(Apr. 12, 2006, 11:21 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2006/04/margin-of-error-leads-
all-candidates.html; see also Candidates, Stop Campaigning! Poll Says You’re Going Back-
wards, UPPITY WISCONSIN, (July 15, 2010, 3:11 PM), http://uppitywis.org/candidates-stop-
campaigning-poll-says-youre-going-backwards (“[The UWSC poll] was conducted over a 
month’s time, and only 300 likely voters were interviewed, for starters.  It simply is not credi-
ble.”). 
117. Beware of Candidates Bearing Polls, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON 
(May 3, 2005, 10:15 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2005/05/beware-of-candidates-
bearing-polls.html; see generally Andrew Alexander, Margin for Error in Reporting on Polls, 
WASH. POST, July 26, 2009, at A17. 
118. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
119. Nate Silver, Methodology, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT, (Oct. 10, 2013), http://fivethirt 
yeight.blogs.nytimes.com/methodology/. 
120. Albert Mehrabian, Effects of Poll Reports on Voter Preferences, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 2119, 2119 (1998). 
121. See Beware of Candidates Bearing Polls, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL 
CHRISTOFFERSON, supra note 117 (“[T]he media would be well advised to be much more 
skeptical when it is given part of a candidate’s poll.  The Walker memo is typical.  It shares a 
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2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 115 
A poll by Fair Wisconsin, the group that opposed the Wisconsin 
Marriage Amendment, illustrates these problems well.  After Governor 
Doyle released his 2009 budget, which included a domestic-partnership 
registry for same-sex couples, Fair Wisconsin touted a poll it sponsored 
on that topic: “[T]he survey found that 77 percent of Wisconsin voters 
support some recognition of gay couples.  Only 20 percent felt that 
‘there should be no legal recognition of a relationship between gay and 
lesbian couples.’”122  It would be a significant mistake for a court to con-
sider such a poll as evidence when deciding the “voter intent” behind 
the Wisconsin Marriage Amendment.  The question was worded in such 
a way as to elicit a particular response that would allow Fair Wisconsin 
to do exactly what it did: push the poll in news stories as evidence of 
widespread support for the Governor’s domestic-partnership proposal.123  
Chief Justice Rehnquist rightly pointed out that a poll’s sponsorship can 
“bear on the objectivity of the results.”124  To paraphrase Mr. Christof-
ferson’s advice: “Beware of [litigants and amici] bearing polls!”125 
In sum, polling is a complicated endeavor.  As the foregoing section 
has illustrated, a number of methodological questions must be asked to 
determine the quality of a poll.  Courts, especially those on the appellate 
level, do not possess the necessary expertise to parse polling data.  Judg-
es are not pollsters, and they should not pretend to be.  Nor should they 
use survey data to reinterpret the meaning of the text that the voters 
approved in the only poll that matters: the ratification vote on election 
day. 
Finally, near-contemporaneous legislative enactments may be a poor 
guide when seeking the intent of the enacting legislature.126  The Wis-
consin Marriage Amendment, for instance, was sponsored by Republi-
cans in the legislature.127  It passed two successive sessions because Re-
 
few selected pieces of good news for Walker from a long questionnaire that asked all sorts of 
other things they are not telling us about.”). 
122. Judith Davidoff, Benefit Brawl, CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at 10. 
123. Jack Craver, Gay Rights Go Mainstream Here, ISTHMUS, July 9, 2010, at 6. 
124. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 327 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
125. Beware of Candidates Bearing Polls, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON, 
supra note 117. 
126. See Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶¶ 70–73, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666 
(declining to resolve the question of how a changed legislative majority affects the analysis of 
contemporaneous legislation). 
127. S. J. Res. 53, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2006) (listing sponsoring senators); 
Assemb. J. Res. 66, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003) (listing sponsoring assemblyper-
sons). 
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publicans in control of the Assembly and Senate scheduled the measure 
and saw to its passage.128  The people of Wisconsin ratified the amend-
ment in the fall 2006 general election.129  On that very same day, voters 
elected a Democratic majority to the state senate.130  Obviously, voters’ 
general preference for Democrats did not include a specific preference 
for that party’s stance on the marriage amendment.  Two years later, 
Wisconsinites elected a Democratic majority in the state assembly while 
retaining the senate majority.131  With the governorship also in hand, the 
new majorities passed a state budget that included domestic-partner 
benefits for state employees and a statewide domestic-partnership regis-
try.132  Should these actions, taken only three years after the amend-
ment’s passage, guide the court in applying its language?  Obviously not.  
The legislature that passed those budget provisions was substantially dif-
ferent from the one that passed the amendment—many members had 
turned over, and more importantly, majority control of both houses had 
changed parties.  This example illustrates that changing circumstances 
may make near-contemporaneous legislative decisions an unreliable 
guide for interpreting constitutional provisions. 
In sum, the court’s current methodology for interpreting constitu-
tional provisions relies on flawed sources.  Legislative history can be 
abused by those who write it in an attempt to shape the interpretation of 
the law, and by those using it in court, who may select non-
representative or misleading sources.  Even when honestly evaluated, 
legislative history can be confusing and inconsistent.  Additionally, the 
entire project begins from the false premise that a unified intent can be 
divined from anything other than the words that the majority agreed to 
enact. 
Recent scholarship has shown that popular history from the 
 
128. Wis. S. J. Res. 53 (approving the proposed amendment on second consideration and 
submitting it to the people for referendum); Wis. Assemb. J. Res. 66 (approving the proposed 
amendment and referring it to the 2005–2006 legislature). 
129. Bill Glauber, State Voters Say ‘I Do’ to Marriage Amendment, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 2006, at 9A. 
130. Patrick Marley & Larry Sandler, Lehman, Sullivan Lead Takeover for Democrats, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 2006, at 10A. 
131. Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Democrats Face Election Reality Check, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 7, 2008, at 1B. 
132. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 773 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. §  40.02(20) (2011–
2012) (including domestic partners in definition of “dependent” under the public employee 
trust fund)); see also id. § 3218 (codified at WIS. STAT. §§ 770.001–770.18) (requiring that 
county clerk keep “declaration of domestic partnership docket”). 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 63 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 63 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
SUHR 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/6/2014  3:01 PM 
2013] INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 117 
statewide ratification campaign suffers these same flaws.  Popular histo-
ry that relies on newspaper clippings, moreover, prioritizes a source that 
is quickly losing relevance over a source that affects many more vot-
ers—namely, campaign advertising.  Yet this source too has problems as 
an interpretive guide.  The court’s other source of voter intent, public 
opinion polling, varies widely in quality, precision, and objectivity—
making it an unreliable signpost for the court.  All of these concerns 
should lead the Wisconsin Supreme Court to stop its current ritual of 
examining the entrails of a provision’s history when the text is unambig-
uous. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR INTERPRETIVE CONSISTENCY 
Rather than focus on concerns about intent-based interpretation like 
those outlined above, the Kalal majority sought to advance positive 
goods associated with the rule of law through its insistence on a text-first 
approach to statutory interpretation.133  The majority believed that “[a]n 
interpretive method that focuses on textual, intrinsic sources of statutory 
meaning and cabins the use of extrinsic sources of legislative intent is 
grounded in more than a mistrust of legislative history or cynicism about 
the capacity of the legislative or judicial processes to be manipulated.”134  
Rather, “[t]he principles of statutory interpretation that we have restat-
ed here are rooted in and fundamental to the rule of law.”135 
What are these “rule of law” values advanced by the majority’s tex-
tualism?  The court turned to the nation’s foremost champion of textual-
ist interpretation, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, to explain: 
Ours is “a government of laws not men,” and “it is simply in-
compatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with 
fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by 
what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver 
promulgated.”  “It is the law that governs, not the intent of the 
lawgiver. . . .  Men may intend what they will; but it is only the 
laws that they enact which bind us.”136 
 
133. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 45, 52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110. 
134. Id. ¶ 52. 
135. Id.; see also In re Commitment of Gilbert, 2012 WI 72, ¶ 28 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 82, 816 
N.W.2d 215 (“The dissent . . . undertakes an analysis that is representative of the precise evil 
that Kalal was designed to combat: the use of legislative history in lieu of the language of the 
statute.”). 
136. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 52 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
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Justice Scalia has made the same point elsewhere in a pithier manner: 
“[W]e are a Government of laws, not of committee reports.”137 
The Kalal majority briefly referenced two other arguments for its 
method.  First, “[j]udicial deference to the policy choices enacted into 
law by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus pri-
marily on the language of the statute.”138  Second, “the words rather than 
the intent survived the procedures” laid out in the constitution—
passage, presentment, and enactment.139 
Everything that drove the court’s pronouncements in Kalal is equal-
ly true in the constitutional-interpretation context.  It is not the intent of 
the legislators or voters but the text that they approved that is part of 
the state’s fundamental law.  Judicial deference to the policy choices 
embodied in a provision requires respect for its language.  Only the 
words of an amendment survived two successive sessions of the legisla-
ture and a statewide referendum of the people.  The Missouri Court of 
Appeals had it right when it said, 
Regardless of the pre-election intentions of the drafters of 
the Act, or the views of individual supporters or opponents of 
the Proposition, or the explanations of the media, the Proposi-
tion and its express language became the law of this state when 
the overwhelming majority of the voters adopted the Proposi-
tion.  By that law we are bound.140 
The court that relied so willingly on Justice Scalia in Kalal should al-
so follow his views on the transitive applicability of textualism.  Profes-
sor Kevin Stack summarizes them: 
 
INTERPRETATION 17 (1997)).  The majority noted elsewhere, “It is the enacted law, not the 
unenacted intent, that is binding on the public.”  Id. ¶ 44. 
137. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see 
also Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 540–41 (Mich. 2008) 
(“[T]he voters here did not vote for or against any brochure produced by Citizens for the Pro-
tection of Marriage; rather, they voted for or against a ballot proposal that contained the ac-
tual language of the marriage amendment.”). 
138. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44. 
139. Id. ¶ 52 n.9 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 430 (1989)); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original In-
tent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (1988) (“After all, Con-
gress votes on the bill, not on the reports.  No one can vote against a report, and the President 
cannot veto the language of a report.”). 
140. Missourians for Honest Elections v. Mo. Elections Comm’n, 536 S.W.2d 766, 774–
75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); see also State ex rel. Evans v. Stewart, 161 P. 309, 312 (Mont. 1916); 
Doyle v. Torrence, 310 S.W.2d 425, 427–28 (Tenn. 1958). 
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In Scalia’s vision, the Constitution is analogous to a statute, and 
it should be interpreted in accordance with the same norms and 
interpretive aims that apply to statutes.  Scalia thus embraces a 
principle of democratic interpretive uniformity under which the 
enactedness of a legal text determines that it will be interpreted 
according the same interpretive norms as apply to other demo-
cratically enacted texts—textualist originalism.141 
In addition to Scalia and several of his brethren on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, many state courts already use the same methods of construction 
for both statutory and constitutional cases.142  Moreover, many state 
 
141. Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2004) (citing SCALIA, supra note 136, at 37); see also SCALIA, su-
pra note 136, at 37 (“I wish to address a final subject: the distinctive problem of constitutional 
interpretation.  The problem is distinctive, not because special principles of interpretation 
apply, but because the usual principles are being applied to an unusual text.”).  Stack further 
notes that Professor William Eskridge uses his “dynamic” approach to interpretation regard-
less of the type of text (statutory or constitutional) that is subject to analysis.  Stack, supra, at 
15.  Stack goes on to critique this position throughout the rest of the article, arguing that dif-
ferent types of legal documents call for different interpretative approaches (based on, for in-
stance, the ease with which they may be amended).  Id. at 57–58. 
142. Clark v. Container Corp. of Am., Inc., 589 So. 2d 184, 190 n.4 (Ala. 1991); Brooks v. 
Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Alaska 1999); Brewer v. Fergus, 79 S.W.3d 831, 834 (Ark. 2002); 
Thompson v. Dep’t of Corr., 18 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Cal. 2001); Danielson v. Dennis, 139 P.3d 
688, 691 (Colo. 2006); Ford v. Browning, 992 So. 2d 132, 136 (Fla. 2008); Westerberg v. An-
drus, 757 P.2d 664, 666 n.2 (Idaho 1988); People v. Purcell, 778 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ill. 2002); 
Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 193, 199 (Iowa 2004); Snowton v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 6 So. 
3d 164, 168 (La. 2009); Davis v. Slater, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); Council 23 
Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 188 N.W.2d 206, 208 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1971); Clark v. Pawlenty, 755 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Minn. 2008); State ex rel. Long v. 
Justice Court, 156 P.3d 5, 8 (Mont. 2007); We the People Nev. ex rel. Angle v. Miller, 192 P.3d 
1166, 1170 (Nev. 2008); State ex rel. Richardson v. Fifth Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 160 
P.3d 566, 571 (N.M. 2007); Wendell v. Lavin, 158 N.E. 42, 44 (N.Y. 1927); State ex rel. Martin 
v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (N.C. 1989); Kelsh v. Jaeger, 641 N.W.2d 100, 104 (N.D. 2002); 
State v. Rodgers, 850 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); City of Guymon v. Butler, 92 P.3d 
80, 84 (Okla. 2004); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1147 
n.4 (Or. 1993); Commonwealth v. McNeil, 808 A.2d 950, 954 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Neel v. 
Shealy, 199 S.E.2d 542, 545 (S.C. 1973); Acreman v. Sharp, 282 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tex. App. 
2009); Comm. to Reform Hampshire Cnty. Gov’t v. Thompson, 674 S.E.2d 207, 211 (W. Va. 
2008); see also Whitcomb v. Young, 279 N.E.2d 566, 571 (Ind. 1972); Op. of the Justices, 484 
A.2d 999, 1001 (Me. 1984); Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. 2007); Hall v. 
Progress Pig, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Neb. 2000).  But see Mich. United Conservation 
Clubs v. Dep’t of Treasury, 608 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Kuhn v. Curran, 61 
N.E.2d 513, 517 (N.Y. 1945); State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 878 (Vt. 2006); Dairyland Grey-
hound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 116, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Prosser, J., dis-
senting) (attempting to justify the distinction between constitutional and statutory methods of 
interpretation); Pierre Schlag, Framers Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 283, 311–22 (1985) (arguing reasons for different methods of interpretation). 
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courts use the same methods of construction whether a law was passed 
by the usual legislative process or by a statewide referendum.143 
In sum, Justice Diane Sykes and her colleagues in the Kalal majority 
sought to establish a method of statutory interpretation that honored 
the rule of law in Wisconsin.144  They placed the court’s focus on the text 
of the statute before them because only the text possesses the force of 
law.145  The same noble motives and persuasive reasons should lead the 
court to adopt a Kalal framework for constitutional interpretation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued its decision in Kalal, a 
majority of the court decided to adopt a particular method of statutory 
interpretation for all subsequent decisions by Wisconsin courts.146  In do-
ing so, the court chose to avoid the problems associated with legislative 
history, both practical and jurisprudential.  Instead, the justices chose to 
honor the rule of law by focusing first on the enacted text of the law. 
The considerations that drove the court’s majority in Kalal should 
lead it to reject the current method it uses to interpret the state constitu-
tion.  The Busé methodology relies on flawed sources in a futile attempt 
to discover a mythical common intent.  Moreover, replacing Busé with a 
textualist methodology would advance the rule-of-law values that in-
spired Kalal. 
In its next constitutional-interpretation case, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court should draw upon Coulee Catholic Schools v. Labor & Indus. Re-
view Comm’n147 to finally and emphatically end the reign of Sinclair and 
 
143. People v. Lopez, 103 P.3d 270, 272 (Cal. 2005); Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 
215, 228 n.10 (Colo. 1994); State ex rel. Jones v. Erickson, 244 P. 287, 290 (Mont. 1926); Neva-
da Tax Comm’n v. Bernhard, 683 P.2d 21, 23 (Nev. 1984); Anthony v. Veatch, 220 P.2d 493, 
507–08 (Or. 1950); Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue v. Hoppe, 512 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Wash. 
1973); 1985–1986 MICH. ATT’Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP., at 310, 1986 WL 233309; Jack L. Lan-
dau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An Assessment of Proposals to Apply Special-
ized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 487, 532 (1998); Silak, supra note 56, at 3; 
see also Michael M. O’Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons from the 
Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 283 (2003) (reviewing fifty-one cases 
that confirm Prof. Schacter’s conclusion); Schacter, supra note 80, at 119 (reviewing fifty-
three cases and concluding that judges apply “ordinary rules of interpretation” to laws passed 
by initiative). 
144. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110. 
145. Id. ¶¶ 44–47. 
146. Id. ¶¶ 44–53. 
147. Coulee Catholic Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868. 
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Busé and to inaugurate the use of the Kalal principles in state constitu-
tional cases.  Justice Stephen Markman of the Michigan Supreme Court 
put it well in National Pride at Work: 
The role of this Court is not to determine who said what about 
the amendment before it was ratified, or to speculate about how 
these statements may have influenced voters.  Instead, our re-
sponsibility is, as it has always been in matters of constitutional 




148. Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 542 (Mich. 2008).  
One source that was helpful but not cited elsewhere in this article is John Sundquist, Con-
struction of the Wisconsin Constitution-Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 62 MARQ. L. 
REV. 531 (1979). 
